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Abstract
Responses to changes in marginal income tax rates can be more
complex than a simple adjustment in hours worked. Given this, a
more inclusive way to assess the deadweight costs of taxes on labour
income is to examine the eﬀect of changes in the marginal tax rate
on taxable income rather than on labour supply. In this paper we
apply a grouping estimator to data from the UK Survey of Personal
Incomes so assess the magnitude of taxable income responses of the
self employed. Our results point to a modest degree of deadweight
loss.
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1Executive Summary
Recognition that deadweight loss from marginal taxation of labour income
can arise from dimensions of response other than simply hours of work has
become increasingly widespread. The UK oﬀers a particularly interesting
context in which to assess such eﬀects given the intensity of tax reform over
the last two decades with the abolition of many higher rate tax bands, a
substantial shift from direct to indirect taxation and changes to the tax
treatment of married couples. In this paper, we apply a grouping estimator
to repeated cross-sectional data from the Survey of Personal Incomes to assess
the empirical magnitude of taxable income responses in the UK.
We choose to focus on the self employed as a group of taxpayers of partic-
ular interest. For employed workers the idea that hours of work are the main
dimension of response to changing rates of labour taxation seems plausible.
On the other hand, the conventional labour supply model of an individual
choosing work time given a ﬁxed hourly remuneration seems a poor descrip-
tion of the self employed. For such people choices can involve such consid-
erations as eﬀort, employment-related expenses, forms of remuneration and
openness with tax authorities. All of these have implications for the magni-
tude of deadweight loss and all of them seem to call for an empirical analysis
based on responsiveness of taxable income.
We focus on group-mean responses of taxable earned income to tax rate
changes across a period of reform both in the structure and in the rates of
taxation on earned income. Our ﬁndings point to taxable income responding
positively to cuts in tax rates within this group and to a modest degree of
associated deadweight loss.
21 Introduction
Recognition that deadweight loss from marginal taxation of labour income
can arise from dimensions of response other than simply hours of work has be-
come increasingly widespread. The possible quantitative importance of such
eﬀects has been emphasised by the evidence of Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein
(1995a,b), for example, that taxable income in the US may be highly respon-
sive to marginal tax rates. Althought the empirical basis for some of these
results is contentious (see Slemrod 1995, Goolsbee 2000, Moﬃtt and Wil-
helm 2000, for example), Feldstein’s (1999) observation that taxable income
responses make a sounder basis for an inclusive assessment of deadweight
loss remains compelling. An increasing number of papers have sought to
determine the size of such eﬀects both for the US (Auten and Caroll 1999,
Gruber and Saez 2000) and elsewhere (Aarbu and Thoresen 2001, Sillamaa
and Veall 2001).
The UK oﬀers a particularly interesting context in which to assess such
eﬀects given the intensity of tax reform over the last two decades with the
abolition of many higher rate tax bands, a substantial shift from direct to
indirect taxation and changes to the tax treatment of married couples . Many
of the studies cited above use evidence from panels of tax records in periods
of tax reform. No such panel exists in the public domain for the UK. However
there do exist repeated cross sectional samples of information drawn from tax
records. In this paper, we apply a grouping estimator to such data to assess
the empirical magnitude of taxable income responses in the UK.
We choose to focus on the self employed as a group of taxpayers of par-
ticular interest. For employed workers the idea that hours of work are the
main dimension of response to changing rates of labour taxation seems plau-
sible. On the other hand, the conventional labour supply model of an indi-
vidual choosing work time given a ﬁxed hourly remuneration seems a poor
description of the self employed. For such people choices can involve such
considerations as eﬀort, employment-related expenses, forms of remuneration
and openness with tax authorities1. All of these have implications for the
magnitude of deadweight loss and all of them seem to call for an empirical
analysis based on responsiveness of taxable income.
We focus on group-mean responses of taxable earned income to tax rate
1For consideration of the extent of tax evasion on earned income in the UK see Dilnot
and Morris (1981), Brown, Levin, Rosa and Ulph (1984) and Smith (1986).
3changes across a period of reform both in the structure and in the rates of
taxation on earned income. Responsiveness of asset income is ignored both
for reasons of theory and of data comparability. Our ﬁndings point to taxable
income responding positively to cuts in tax rates within this group and to a
modest degree of associated deadweight loss.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical lit-
erature on deadweight loss in the context of a general model of behavioural
response under uncertainty. Taxable income elasticities are shown to be de-
terminants of a component - typically the main or exclusive component - of
the loss in a wide variety of models. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy.
Section 4 describes the data and relevant points about the UK tax system.
Section 5 presents results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Deadweight loss in income tax models with
exemptions, avoidance and evasion
Consider a taxpayer receiving risk free lump sum untaxed income of Y .T h e
taxpayer engages in economic activity z returning an uncertain increment to
before tax income R(z,t) and leading to an uncertain tax bill T(z,t)w h e r e
t is the tax rate.
Given direct von Neumann Morgenstern utility V (Y +R(z,t)−T(z,t),z),
deﬁne the indirect expected utility function by the maximum expected utility
attainable through choice of z:
ψ(Y,t) ≡ max
z EV (Y + R(z,t) − T(z,t),z). (1)
Correspondingly deﬁne an uncompensated economic activity function by the
optimum value of z in this problem:
h(Y,t) ≡ argmax
z EV (Y + R(z,t) − T(z,t),z). (2)
Now deﬁne an expenditure function as the lowest value of Y allowing an
expected utility of u to be reached given t:
g(u,t) ≡ min
Y {Y |ψ(Y,t) ≥ u} (3)
and deﬁne a compensated economic activity function by
ζ(u,t) ≡ h(g(u,t),t). (4)
4Finally deﬁne an uncompensated risk premium conditionally on z, r(Y,z,t),
by
EV (Y +R(z,t)−T(z,t),z) ≡ V (Y −r(y,z,t)+ER(z,t)−ET(z,t),z)( 5 )
and a compensated risk premium by
π(u,z,t) ≡ r(g(u,t),z,t). (6)
By appropriate substitution
u ≡ V (g(u,t) − π(u,ζ(u,t),t)+E R(ζ(u,t),t) − ET(ζ(u,t),t),ζ(u,t)). (7)














There are three terms here.
• For a linear tax the derivative ∂T(ζ(u,t),t)/∂t is taxable income, in
which case the ﬁrst term is simply expected (compensated) taxable
income.
• The second term covers any further eﬀect of the tax rate on the indi-
vidual’s expected resources after taxation such as through compliance
costs.
• The ﬁnal element covers the impact on the risk premium π(u,ζ(u,t),t).
If we deﬁne deadweight loss l(u,t) as the diﬀerence between the tax that
could have been raised through a risk-free lump sum tax without harming
expected utility and the expected tax revenue under the existing tax system
then
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5(assuming ET(ζ(u,0),0) = 0).
This gives a three-term decomposition for the expression for deadweight
loss. Under a linear tax, the ﬁrst term is a Harberger triangle on a taxable
income diagram (see, for example, Auerbach and Hines 2002, Slemrod and
Yitzhaki 2002). The second captures deadweight loss from, for example,
compliance costs. The third term arises from the eﬀect of taxation on the
taxpayer cost of income risk.
Two special cases deserve mention.
• Firstly, in the absence of risk, the ﬁrst two terms comprise the whole
of the deadweight loss. If R(z,t)=R(z), so that taxes lower expected
resources only through the tax payment, then the excess burden arises
solely from the induced substitution responses and is measured accu-
rately by an appropriate Harberger triangle.
• Secondly, suppose z has no direct eﬀect on utility and the taxpayer is
therefore simply maximising EV (y +R(z,t)−T(z,t)). Then it follows
directly from (7) that2
g(u,t) − π(u,ζ(u,t),t)+E R(ζ(u,t),t) − ET(ζ(u,t),t)
= g(u,0) − π(u,ζ(u,0),0) + ER(ζ(u,0),0)
⇒ l(u,t)=[ π(u,ζ(u,t),t) − π(u,ζ(u,0),0)]
−E[R(ζ(u,t),t) − R(ζ(u,0),0)] (10)
There is now no deadweight loss from induced substitution between
t h ec o m p o n e n t so fz and after tax income. The deadweight loss is the
additional risk premium and the expected loss in before tax income as
a result of the tax.
We proceed in what follows to illustrate the role of taxable income re-
sponses as determinants of deadweight loss in several examples.
2The derivation here needs no diﬀerentiability assumption. However if the functions














and making the appropriate substitution.
62.1 Exemptions
Suppose a taxpayer faces a linear tax at rate t on taxable labour income in
excess of an allowance E. The taxpayer has a wage of w, works for h hours
to earn wh and has untaxed income of Y from other sources. Certain forms
of remuneration are exempt from tax and certain sorts of expenditure attract
relief against taxed labour income. Consumption of the goods concerned x,
priced at p, has total value p x. The taxpayer’s utility function is V (C,h,x)
where C is consumption out of income after tax. (These sorts of means of
avoiding tax are considered by Feldstein 1999).
In the notation used above, z =( h,x ) , R(z,t)=wh − p x, T(z,t)=
t(wh−p x−E). This is a case where R(z,t) does not depend on t and there
is no uncertainty so a Harberger triangle should capture the whole of the
deadweight loss.
The deadweight loss arises solely from the induced substitution responses




V (Y +( wh− p
 x)(1 − t)+Et,h,x) (11)
and
g(u,t) ≡ min
Y {Y |ψ(Y,t) ≥ u}.
By application of Shephard’s lemma, the derivative of g(u,t) with respect
to (1 − t) gives the compensated demand for tax-exempt goods plus the
allowance less the pretax value of compensated labour supply (p x+E−wh).
Deﬁne a compensated taxable income function χ(u,t) ≡ ∂g(u,t)/∂t =( wh−
p x − E). A conventional deadweight loss formula would apply
l(u,t) ≡ g(u,t) − g(u,0) − tχ(u,t)







  − tχ(u,t). (12)
This is essentially the point made by Feldstein (1999).
The value of the deadweight loss is obviously not simply determined by
the tax rate t but also by the policy choice regarding which sorts of expen-
diture qualify for exemption - an illustration of a point made by Slemrod
(1998).
72.2 Avoidance
The taxpayer faces a linear tax at rate t on taxable income x in excess of an
allowance E but has access to means of avoiding tax with no direct impact
on utility except through the reduction in tax liability produced. To reduce
taxable income by a further amount A we assume the taxpayer has to spend
an amount D(A,t) in terms of personal eﬀort or legal fees. The cost D(A,t)
is assumed increasing and convex in A with D(0,t) = 0. Utility is therefore
V (Y + x − (x − A − E)t − D(A,t)). (This sort of formulation of avoidance
decisions is similar to Slemrod (2001)).
In the notation used above, z = A, R(z,t)=x − D(A,t), T(z,t)=
t(x − A − E). There is no uncertainty and if R(z,t) does not depend on t
then a Harberger triangle should capture the whole of the deadweight loss.





and denote the solution to this condition by A = α(t). We can now deﬁne
ψ(Y,t) ≡ max
A V (Y + x(1 − t)+( A + E)t − D(A,t)) (14)
and
g(u,t) ≡ min
Y {Y |ψ(Y,t) ≥ u}
= g(u,0) − tα(t)+D(α(t),t).
Deadweight loss is then
l(u,t) ≡ g(u,t) − g(u,0) + tα(t) (15)
= D(α(t),t).
The deadweight loss consists of the eﬀort expended and fees paid to lawyers3








3To interpret this as the social loss requires that this be an accurate valuation of the
best alternative use of the lawyers’ time, which will of course be true under appropriate
competitive conditions.
8Thus, if D(A,t)=D(A) so that legal fees depend only on the amount by
which taxable income is reduced independently of the rate at which the
income is taxed, then a Harberger triangle representation is valid despite the








Another means of evading tax is illegality. Suppose the structure of tax is as
in the avoidance example just discussed. The taxpayer can choose to conceal
an amount K of taxable income from the tax authority by misreporting. This
enhances income if successful but runs the risk of discovery with probability p
in which case the taxpayer pays not only the true liability but also a ﬁne of φ
per unit of income undeclared. Modelling the evasion decision as an expected
utility maximisation accords with the standard model of such behaviour due
to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973).
Let us count the ﬁnes paid as part of government revenue. In the notation
used above, z = K, R(z,t)=x, T(z,t)=t(x − K − E). with probability
(1 − p)a n dt(x − E) − φK with probability p.
Say that expected utility is
ψ(Y,t)=m a x
K (1 − p)V (Y + x(1 − t)+( K + E)t,K) (17)
+pV (Y + x(1 − t)+Et− Kφ,K).
By allowing V (.) to depend directly on K we allow for the possibility that
dishonesty troubles the taxpayer’s conscience, a feature omitted from simpler
models in this tradition.
There are two aspects to deadweight loss. In the standard model with-
out dependence of V (.)o nK, the deadweight loss is solely a consequence
of the increased risk borne by an evading taxpayer. The only behavioural
response to taxation here is the gamble of evasion and the deadweight loss is
measured by the associated risk premium as in (10). (This point is made by
Yitzhaki 1987). If V (.) does depend on K then there is also deadweight loss
associated with the substitution towards dishonesty. Higher tax rates make
4Feldstein is careful to note that his analysis applies only where avoidance reduces
spendable income in a linear way.
9honesty more expensive and the taxpayer will substitute ineﬃciently away
from clarity of conscience.
Note that deadweight loss depends on the other policy parameters p and
φ - another illustration of the point stressed by Slemrod (1988).
3 Empirical speciﬁcation
We observe individuals in periods before and after a tax reform. Suppose
taxable earned income yit declared by the ith individual in period t is
yit = αi + βρit + vit (18)
where ρit denotes a vector of tax-related variables, αi is an individual spe-
ciﬁc intercept (capturing, say, preference heterogeneity), β is the vector of
tax responsiveness parameters to be estimated and vit is a disturbance term
(capturing, say, shocks to earnings from sources unrelated to tax-inﬂuenced
decisions). A dynamic speciﬁcation of joint earnings and savings decisions
is beyond the scope of our present static model, and so we take investment
income as given in the current period and focus on earned income as our de-
pendent variable. In practice, ρit comprises transformations of the marginal
tax rate τit and virtual income µit deﬁned by µit = τityit − Tit + Iit where
Iit is the individual’s investment income in period t and Tit is tax liability
(which depends on earned and investment income). To be speciﬁc, in the
empirical application below we choose ρit =( l n ( 1−τit),µ it)  so that taxable
income depends linearly on log of the marginal retention rate (or ”net of
tax rate”) and on virtual income. Such a speciﬁcation is suggested by the
popular semilog formulation for labour supply (see, for example, Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir 1998).
Unless the tax function in each period is linear, ρit is a period-speciﬁc
function of taxable income, say ρit = ft(yit), and therefore correlated with αi
and vit. OLS estimates of (18) will therefore yield biased estimates of β.
Diﬀerencing (18) removes the ﬁxed individual terms αi
∆yit = β∆ρit +∆ vit. (19)
The change in ρit can be decomposed into a part due to the tax reform
at initial taxable income and due to the change in taxable income




10Without panel data we cannot observe changes at the individual level.
However, if we assume that the population is divided into groups, g =1 ,...,G,
by certain permanent characteristics a grouping estimator becomes feasible.
Letting ˜ Xgt denote E(Xit|i ∈ g) − E(Xit) for arbitrary variable Xit,w ec a n
aggregate (19) and (20) to group level and remove the time mean to get
∆ ygt = β∆˜ ρgt +∆˜ vgt
∆˜ ρgt =∆ ˜ ρ
0
gt + ˜ εgt, (21)
noting that ∆ ygt,∆ ˜ ρgt and ∆˜ ρ
0
gt are all estimable from the repeated cross
section. It is important to note that, given the nonlinearity of the tax sched-
ule, we construct estimates of ∆˜ ρgt and ∆˜ ρ
0
gt by applying the tax functions to
incomes in the microdata and then averaging, not by applying the tax func-
tions to averaged incomes. We can then estimate β using an appropriate
group-level moment condition.
Let us suppose that individual taxable income shocks vit take a permanent
transitory form ∆vit = vP
it +∆ vT
it where vP
it is a permanent shock and vT
it is






t we could use the moment condition
E(∆˜ ρgt∆˜ vgt)=0 . (22)
Such an estimator could be implemented by weighted OLS regression on
grouped diﬀerenced data or by unweighted IV regression in the pooled data
including group and year dummies among the regressors and instrument-
ing with group-year interactions. We prefer the latter approach, calculating
standard errors allowing for group-year clustering, but we refer to this as the
weighted OLS estimator for expositional clarity. The assumption of no group
level deviation from aggregate permanent shocks is a strong one however and
could lead to serious bias if incorrect. In particular, if marginal tax rates in-
crease with income then responsiveness of taxable income would typically be
downwardly biased if estimated in this way.
A better basis for estimation would be the moment condition
E(∆˜ ρ
0
gt∆˜ vgt)=0 . (23)
Assuming that ˜ vP
gt is uncorrelated with ∆˜ ρ
0
gt would be justiﬁed by assum-
ing that permanent shocks are independent of lagged incomes, since ∆˜ ρ
0
gt
depends only on income in the previous period. However since transitory
11shocks in period t − 1 will be correlated with taxable income in t − 1w e
might expect ∆vT
it to be correlated with ∆ρ0
it if tax changes are correlated
with initial period taxable income. (This is the “mean reversion” point em-
phasised, for example, by Gruber and Saez 2000). Applying (23) would
nonetheless be acceptable if E(vT
it|i ∈ g)=vT
t so that there are no group
level deviations from aggregate transitory shocks.
There are several equivalent means to implement an estimator based on
(23) . This is implemented below by regressing yit on ρit in the pooled
data including group and year dummies, with instruments taking group-year
mean values ˜ ρgt−1 in year t − 1a n d˜ ρgt−1 +∆˜ ρ
0
gt in year t, and allowing for
group-year clustering in calculating standard errors. The resulting coeﬃcient
estimates are numerically identical to those obtained by running a weighted
IV regression on grouped diﬀerenced data and we refer to this as the weighted
IV estimator.
In principle, given the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, additional overi-
dentifying instruments could be constructed, for instance, from changes in
taxes at other income levels related to initial taxable income5. In other words,
we would use the further moment conditions
E(∆˜ ρ
η
gt∆˜ vgt)=0 . (24)
where ∆ρ
η
it ≡ [ft(η(yit−1))−ft−1(η(yit−1))] for appropriate choice of η(.). We
explore this empirically in the application below, using η(y)=3 y/2a n d
η(y)=2 y/3.
4 UK Income Taxation and the Self Employed
4.1 Data
Our intention is to investigate determination of taxable income as a response
to parameters of the tax system. Many surveys, such as the Family Expen-
diture Survey, General Household Survey or Labour Force Survey, contain
cross sectional information on individual and household incomes. Since none
of these however are explicitly focussed on calculation of individual tax lia-
bilities, none collect information on tax exemptions or tax declaration, and
use of these data would risk missing interesting dimensions of response rel-
evant in the context of the current exercise. While they might be useful for
5We owe this point to Jerry Hausman.
12a study of labour supply responses, this aspect of tax responsiveness has al-
ready been extensively studied using these sources (see for example Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir 1998).
The Survey of Personal Incomes is a series of cross sectional data sets
compiled by the Inland Revenue from income tax returns. The principal
motive for conducting the survey is to cost proposed changes to tax rates,
personal allowances and other tax reliefs for Treasury Ministers. Although
collected annually, data is currently available in the public domain only for
tax year 1985/6 and for years after and including 1995/6. In the current
paper we use the data for 1985/6 and 1995/6. The survey covers on a strat-
iﬁed sample basis all individuals for whom income tax records are held by
the Inland Revenue and includes over 50000 individuals in each of the years
used. Information included comprises largely that which is necessary to cal-
culate individual tax liabilities less any information which would compromise
anonymity. This means that there is copious detail on individual taxable
income but very limited information on untaxed income sources or other in-
dividual characteristics. Sex and marital status, for example, are recorded
since they are formally relevant to tax bill but not, for example, age (unless
aged 65-74 or 75 and over, since personal allowances vary across these age
groups) or number of children since they are not. Two important pieces of
information included although not relevant to tax bill are region of residence,
since this determines the tax oﬃce dealing with the individual’s aﬀairs, and,
in the case of the self-employed, sector of occupation. We make use of these
variables for grouping in the empirical application below.
4.2 UK taxes on earned income
Three main taxes impinge on earned income in the UK - income tax, national
insurance and value added tax. These are explained, for the years relevant to
this study, in formal detail by Saunders and Smailes (1995) and less formally
by Kay and King (1990).
4.2.1 Income tax
Income tax is a tax levied both on earned income and certain forms of un-
earned income. It works through a system of bands and allowances. Every
taxpayer has a personal allowance - dependent upon marital status - and
pays income tax only on the excess of income over this amount. Tax liability
13rises with income according to marginal rates which increase according to the
income band into which an individual falls. Certain sorts of unearned income
attract tax at rates which may diﬀer from that applied to earned income, of-
ten as a consequence of the Inland Revenue’s preference for deducting tax at
source wherever possible.
Most tax on earned income for employees in the UK is deducted at source
by their employers under a cumulative system known as PAYE (Pay–As-You-
Earn). Evasion of these liabilities for such individuals is almost impossible
except through collusive fraud with their employer. Negotiation over means
of remuneration may nonetheless permit avoidance behaviour in response
to income taxation but again only with the involvement of their employer.
Since the introduction of the self-assessment system in 1996 some employees
are required to complete tax returns, but usually only if paying taxes at
higher rates (in order to permit correct calculation of liabilities on unearned
income) or if receiving untaxed earned income other than through their main
employer.
Self-employed individuals, on the other hand, pay taxes based on submis-
sion of self-completed tax returns and might be expected to have far greater
scope to avoid or evade taxes due on income. We concentrate attention in
what follows on these individuals. The taxation of earnings for self-employed
individuals in the UK is discussed, for example, in Macdonald and White-
house (1993).
4.2.2 National insurance
Payment of national insurance contributions formally entitles an individual
to claim certain social security beneﬁts although in practice the link between
contributions and receipt is so tenuous that one can only sensible regard this
as another part of the general income tax system. For self employed peo-
ple the system is as follows. Those with very low earnings are exempt from
payments. Once earnings pass a small exception, national insurance contri-
butions are made at a ﬂat weekly rate. Once they pass another threshold
known as the lower proﬁts limit, taxes are then paid as a ﬁxed proportion
of proﬁts up to an upper limit in addition to the ﬂat rate amount. The fact
that no further contributions are liable beyond this upper limit means that
the combined marginal rate from income tax and national insurance actually
falls over a certain range of incomes.
144.2.3 Indirect tax
Earnings attract further taxes when spent. The main tax here is value added
tax which applies at the same rate to most forms of spending. There are some
exempt and lower-rated forms of spending (for example, food at home, books,
energy) and there are some goods which attract additional duties (alcoholic
beverages, tobacco, motor fuel). Since we do not wish to enter into modelling
commodity demands we assume that marginal earnings are spent on goods
taxed at the standard rate of value added tax (as, for example, in Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir 1998).
These three taxes combine to give a total marginal tax rate faced by the
tax-payer that is equal to (it + nt + vt)/(1 + vt), where i is the income tax
rate, n is the national insurance contributions rate, and v i st h er a t eo fv a l u e
added tax.
4.3 UK tax reforms
This system of taxation underwent several reforms between 1985/6 and 1995/6.
4.3.1 Changes in tax rates and allowances
The schedule of income taxation was simpliﬁed with the reduction of ﬁve
higher rate bands (with rates of 40% to 60% in 5% steps) to only one, with
the marginal rate in that band equal to that in the lowest of the previous
ﬁve. Oﬀsetting this was the introduction of a lower rate band of 20% at the
other end of the range of taxable income.
Governments over this period aimed to reduce rates of taxation while
transferring tax from direct to indirect. The standard rate of income tax -
that paid by the bulk of taxpayers - was reduced over the period from 30%
to 25% while the rate of value added tax was incresed from 15% to 17.5%.
4.3.2 Independent taxation
Another large change was the switch from a system of joint taxation to
independent taxation for married couples. In 1985/6, unless a household
were to opt for a scheme of separate taxation ﬁnancially appealing to very
few, a wife’s unearned income was treated as her husband’s for tax purposes,
as was the excess of her earned income over a personal wife’s earned income
15allowance. A married man was also entitled to an additional allowance6.B y
1995/6 this had been abolished and the couple were taxed independently with
a transferable “married couple’s allowance” introduced to avoid consequential
redistribution towards single people.
This has implications also for availability of data. In the later year’s
data, all information on spouse’s earnings is absent. For consistency we
therefore need to treat the spouse of interest as a separate individual with
isolable income in each year, whose tax rate and tax payments just happen
to depend on spouse’s income in the earlier year.
4.4 Other issues
4.4.1 Sample selection
The validity of this method depends crucially on the constancy of the chosen
grouping so that in each period our group mean estimates are based on
samples from the same populations. The chosen grouping is based on region
of residence and sector of occupation. This raises a number of issues.
Firstly, since information on age is absent, it is impossible for us to follow
a ﬁxed date-of-birth cohort. The group populations from which the SPI
samples are drawn therefore diﬀer in terms of range of dates of birth. Older
individuals in the earlier year and younger ones in the later year will not be
in the sampled population throughout the period of investigation. Secondly,
region and occupation are not in fact ﬁxed and can change at the individual
level. This is likely to be of concern however only if migration between groups
is systematically related to changes in taxation of earnings.
Perhaps most worrying is the endogeneity of the self-employment decision
itself. If changes in taxation encourage entrepreneurship or encourage self-
employment as a means to exploit tax exemptions which that makes available
then this would provide another reason why the populations of self employed
would not be the same in the two years.
The rise in self-employment in the UK as a proportion of the employed
over the late 1980s and the 1990s is well known. Amongst the explanations
put forward for this rise have been either the ‘push’ eﬀect of the adverse con-
6As Kay and King (1990) remark, reﬂecting on the history of the system, this is ”in
recognition of the burden [his wife] imposes on him ... The underlying concept is self-
evidently anachronistic; it dates from a time when Soames Forsyte was the representative
taxpayer.”
16ditions in the paid-employment sector in the 1980s (male unemployment rates
reached as high as 14%) or the ‘pull’ eﬀect of schemes such as the Enterprise
Allowance Scheme and the Business Start-up Scheme, lower tax rates and
ﬁnancial liberalisation . Both these explanations basically appeal to some
sort of change in the relative returns to being employed of self-employed.
Using time-series data, Parker (1996) uses aggregate time series data to ﬁnd
some evidence for the recession push eﬀect and for a positive impact of the
enterprise schemes, but also a positive eﬀect of marginal tax rates in higher
rate bands on self-employment. This is consistent with Long’s (1982) hy-
pothesis that this sector allows greater ease of tax avoidance or evasion than
the paid-employment sector. Other microeconometric work using UK data
includes Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998) and Henley 1999. Bruce (2000,
2002), Fairlie and Meyer (2000), Gentry and Hubbard (2001) and Schuetze
(2000) provide recent evidence from the US on the relationship between tax
rates and self-employment decisions and, in Bruce’s (2002) words, reach “no
clear consensus”.
The possibility of such an eﬀect is cause for concern as it has the potential
to undermine the exogeneity of our grouping. In so far as possible we look for
evidence on the issue. We do not observe occupational sector for employees
and cannot therefore investigate responsiveness of self-employment status to
taxes for the chosen grouping but region is observed for all individuals and
we can therefore look for evidence of responsiveness at the more aggregated
regional level.
4.4.2 Returns to labour
Tax reforms over the period considered tended to lower tax rates for the
better oﬀ. At the same time it is well known that growing dispersion of
incomes was experienced in many western economies for reasons which almost
certainly go beyond responses to tax changes. Skill biased technological
change, globalisation of world trade, changes in supply of skills and many
other explanations have been oﬀered as reasons for widening income gaps (see
Katz and Autor 1999) and omission of variables capturing these inﬂuences
could be a source of bias in estimated tax eﬀects if they are correlated with
tax changes at the level of the chosen groups. In particular we wish to
capture the inﬂuence of sectoral or regional shifts in demand or supply of
human capital which manifest themselves, say, in the return to labour within
the sector or region.
17Since the SPI has no data on hours it is impossible to calculate wages. It
is not clear that this is well deﬁned for the self employed in any case and, even
if it were, changes in the form of remuneration are part of the response that
we are seeking to pick up. We therefore use data from another source and
for the employed to construct a measure of change in gross labour returns
within the sector and region. To be speciﬁc, we take all employed individuals
working in the same region and sector in the General Household Survey.
4.4.3 Incorporation and mode of income receipt
Self-employed individuals have the option, if they wish, to incorporate their
business as a self-owned limited company. This has tax consequences because
the income of the business will typically then be received in a diﬀerent form.
It will almost certainly remain advantageous to receive some remuneration in
the form of earned income as managerial salary, in order to pay national in-
surance contributions and establish beneﬁt entitlements and probably most
importantly in order to make tax favoured private pension contributions.
However some of the business income will be received in the form of distribu-
tion of dividends. During the period concerned these dividends would attract
corporate taxation which would then establish a tax credit for the individ-
ual when received as income. In 1995/6 the rates were such that dividend
income itself would be subject to income tax at a rate slightly lower than
the rate of tax on earned income. More importantly, in both years dividend
income, unlike earned income, would not be subject to national insurance
contributions. If changes in the tax on earned income increase any incentive
to opt for incorporation and therefore change mode of income receipt then
the sort of empirical exercise pursued here may be seriously misleading. Gor-
don and Slemrod (2000) draw attention to this sort of issue in the context of
US studies.
We choose to focus below on earned income. It would be possible to
calculate a dividend-inclusive measure of income and to an extent this could
avoid problems of this sort However the data draws no distinction between
dividends received from one’s own company and dividends from other com-
panies. More seriously there is concern that it could be tax-advantageous
to pay dividend’s to a spouse if they fall into a lower tax bracket - any
such payments will be missed in the second year’s data as a consequence of
independent taxation. For the purpose of checking robustness we investi-
gate whether there is any evidence that tax rate changes are associated with
18changes in the share of earnings plus dividends received as dividends.
While we appreciate that we cannot wholly address the issues raised here,
the views of tax professionals - reﬂected in discussion of recent proposed tax
changes which may indeed aggravate the incentives to incorporate - suggest
that tax advantages of incorporation are unlikely to have been signiﬁcant in
the years which we investigate.
4.5 Summary of ﬁnal sample
As discussed above, given the fairly limited information we have, we choose
our groups on the basis of occupational sector and region and focus on the
self-employed. The information on occupation sector is not present for the
employees, and, again as mentioned above, the self-employed are likely to
have greater scope for tax avoidance or evasion than employees. Since joint
taxation is in operation in 1985/6, we only have occupation information for a
very few women (24, to be precise) and so we focus on men only in both years.
In addition we only focus on those of working age (below 65, as this is the
extent of the age information available to us). After this selection, we have
10,491 observations in 1985/6 and 10,461 in 1995/6. We have nine regions
and seven industries giving us a total of 63 groups in each year. A summary of
estimated population proportions (recognising sample stratiﬁcation) is given
by region and sector across the two sample years in tables 1 and 6 below
(standard errors are in parentheses).
Table 3 shows the proportions of men aged below 65 that are self-employed
across region and the same information is represented for the later year in
Figure 1. (Information on occupation sector is absent for employees). This
proportion increased for all regions across the two periods. However, we
could ﬁnd no evidence of association between changes in proportions within
region and either change in tax rate or virtual income. This is reassuring
in that it can be regarded as a failure to reject the exogeneity of our chosen
grouping.7.
The choropleth maps in Figures 2 to 4 show some more information about
our sample by region (further tables are given in the appendix). In particular,
we show the change in taxable income and the change both in actual marginal
tax rates and in marginal tax rates at initial (1985/6) income. There is a
7Coeﬃcient estimates were insigniﬁcant in region level regressions, either using OLS or
instrumenting as in the results below.
19clear positive association at regional level between changes in taxable income
and in actual tax rate but much less clearly any such relationship with tax
rate changes at ﬁxed income.
4.6 Construction of variables
The construction of the variables used in the regressions below requires some
discussion. Since we observe only individual tax data in 1995/6 we can-
not model the joint behaviour of married couples. For married couples in
1985/6 we must, therefore, construct variables from the joint tax data that
will be comparable to the 1995/6 information. (Obviously, there is no diﬃ-
culty in the case of single men). The construction of husband’s own taxable
earnings is straightforward since wife’s earnings are listed and can simply
be subtracted from the total. Since only joint deductions are given, we
allocate these in the proportions of each spouse’s income to joint income.
Similarly, wife’s investment income is also listed separately and can be sub-
tracted from joint investment income. The construction of husband’s virtual
income requires the calculation of husband’s share of total tax paid. Since
the counterfactual is that spouses’ actions are taken as given, we calculate
the tax that would be paid if only the wife’s (earned and unearned) income
were present, and subtract this from the total tax paid to give the husband’s
tax. To construct our instrumental variables we need to calculate ft(yit−1)
in the 1985/6 sample, and do this by applying the 1995/6 tax system to our
calculated husband’s own income (or straightforwardly to given income in
the data for single men) in 1985/6.




Agriculture 0.087 (0.003) 0.059 (0.002)
Manufacturing 0.075 (0.003) 0.060 (0.002)
Construction 0.334 (0.004) 0.369 (0.005)
Distribution 0.213 (0.004) 0.173 (0.004)
Transport 0.048 (0.002) 0.062 (0.002)
Finance 0.095 (0.003) 0.131 (0.003)
Other 0.148 (0.003) 0.146 (0.003)
Table 2: Estimated population proportions by region for 1985/6 and 1995/6
Year
Region 1985/6 1995/6
North East 0.040 (0.002) 0.029 (0.002)
Yorks & Humber 0.084 (0.003) 0.080 (0.003)
North West 0.101 (0.003) 0.108 (0.003)
East Midlands 0.074 (0.003) 0.078 (0.003)
West Midlands 0.080 (0.003) 0.083 (0.003)
South East 0.382 (0.005) 0.382 (0.005)
South West 0.121 (0.003) 0.103 (0.003)
Wales 0.048 (0.002) 0.057 (0.002)
Scotland 0.070 (0.002) 0.079 (0.003)
21Table 3: Estimated population proportions of self-employed by region
Year
Region 1985/6 1995/6
North East 0.073 (0.006) 0.119 (0.010)
Yorks & Humber 0.097 (0.005) 0.164 (0.007)
North West 0.090 (0.004) 0.166 (0.006)
East Midlands 0.103 (0.006) 0.180 (0.008)
West Midlands 0.087 (0.005) 0.152 (0.007)
South East 0.133 (0.009) 0.209 (0.007)
South West 0.156 (0.006) 0.207 (0.007)
Wales 0.104 (0.006) 0.207 (0.011)
Scotland 0.073 (0.004) 0.157 (0.007)
22
Figure 1: Proportion self employed 1995/6
23
Figure 2: Change in taxable income 1985/6 - 1995/6
24

Figure 3: Change in marginal tax rate 1985/6 - 1995/6
25

Figure 4: Change in marginal rate at ﬁxed taxable income 1985/6 - 1995/6
265 Results
Table 4 shows the results from the estimation of equation (18) using the
moment conditions (22), (23) and (24). As explained earlier results are cal-
culated by regressions in the pooled data with group and year dummies,
instrumenting appropriately and allowing for group-year clustering in calcu-
lating standard errors. Huber-White robust estimates of standard errors are
given in parentheses and allow for the stratiﬁcation in the SPI sample.
The weighted OLS estimates in the ﬁrst two columns use (22) and show
a negative eﬀect of an increase in the retention rate (or decrease in the tax
rate) on taxable income – the opposite eﬀect to that which we would expect.
Weighted IV estimates in the latter four columns use (23) and (24) and, by
contrast, give positive coeﬃcient estimates. These are signiﬁcant at standard
signiﬁcance levels using the narrower instrument set. F-statistics for the
instruments in the ﬁrst stage reduced form regressions are reported below
and suggest that the tax changes at ﬁxed income are very strong predictors
for the actual changes. In the case of the overidentiﬁed speciﬁcation a Sargan
test of the overidentifying restrictions fails to reject.
The second column of results for each estimation technique shows the
eﬀects of the inclusion of the change in log wages for employees in the same
region/sector groups from the General Household Survey, as described in
section 4.4.2, to account for diﬀering changes in the returns to labour across
groups. The inclusion of this variable does not signiﬁcantly alter the mag-
nitude of the other coeﬃcients, and, the coeﬃcient on change in log wage is
typically not signiﬁcant.
Since tax rates are not typically changed holding virtual income constant,
these numbers can be diﬃcult to interpret. It may help to consider the
implied eﬀect of an actual tax change. Over the period considered the tax
rate on a basic rate taxpayer fell from 0.470 to 0.438. If we suppose that this
were to have happened holding the married man’s tax allowance constant
at its 1985/6 value of £3455 then virtual income for a married basic rate
taxpayer would have had to fall by £110.56. The estimated combined eﬀect
o ft h e s et w oc h a n g e si sr e p o r t e di nt h el o w e rs e c t i o no ft h et a b l ea st h e
uncompensated response. It is signiﬁcant and positive for the estimates based
on the narrower instrument set and positive but closer to zero if using the
additional overidentifying instruments.
Since any taxpayer with income above £3455 would have beneﬁted from
such a change, the compensated change would have been lower. Slutsky
27compensated changes are also reported below the table for someone on the
average 1985/6 taxable income of £5635. The estimated compensated re-
sponse is modestly positive using either set of weighted IV estimates8.
Table 5 shows the results of the regression with the proportion of dividend
income to earned plus dividend income as the dependent variable. Recall
from section 4.4.3 that one concern is that the self-employed may have an
incentive to incorporate their business and pay themselves in the form of
dividend income if this is advantageous for the purpose of reducing their
tax bill. Whilst income tax rates generally went down between 1985/6 and
1995/6, dividend income also became more tax favoured. We report results
in three columns, contrasting in the same way as those of Table 5.2. That is
to say, the ﬁrst column uses general group year interactions as instruments
while the second and third instruments with group level tax changes at ﬁxed
incomes. Results in the second and third columns are the more robust and
show no evidence of any eﬀect.
8We experimented also with a grouping based on position in the pre-tax income distri-
bution rather than on region and occupation. We grouped each year into 50 quantiles to
make the number of groups similar to the number in our preferred grouping. Estimates
were calculated excluding the ln wage control calculated from the General Household Sur-
vey which seemed to make little sense in the context of the revised grouping. We found that
this grouping tended to increase estimated Slutsky compensated income changes by both
increasing the estimated coeﬃcient on ∆ln(1 − τit) and reducing that on ∆µit. However
the Sargan test decisively rejects the overidentifying instruments when using the wider
instrument set. Nonetheless it makes an interesting point of comparison given techniques
used in the prior literature.
286 Conclusion
We have drawn on evidence from UK tax records to assess the extent of
responsiveness in taxable earned income to rates of taxation for the self
employed. More speciﬁcally, we have used a grouping estimator to exploit the
information in the repeated cross sections of the Survey of Personal Incomes.
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35A Appendix: Data summary
Table 6: Average taxable income by sector and year (1985/6 £000s )
Year
Sector 1985/6 1995/6
Agriculture 2.980 (0.222) 5.381 (0.361)
Manufacturing 3.955 (0.271) 5.489 (0.328)
Construction 3.174 (0.083) 4.201 (0.091)
Distribution 3.238 (0.135) 5.120 (0.193)
Transport 3.283 (0.228) 3.735 (0.255)
Finance 9.953 (0.409) 13.324 (0.408)
Other 4.910 (0.229) 9.292 (0.344)
Table 7: Average marginal tax rate by sector and year.
Year
Sector 1985/6 1995/6
Agriculture 0.344 (0.005) 0.351 (0.004)
Manufacturing 0.360 (0.005) 0.353 (0.004)
Construction 0.384 (0.002) 0.362 (0.002)
Distribution 0.355 (0.003) 0.345 (0.003)
Transport 0.377 (0.006) 0.335 (0.005)
Finance 0.412 (0.003) 0.392 (0.002)
Other 0.361 (0.003) 0.356 (0.002)
36Table 8: Average taxable income by region and year (1985/6 £000s)
Year
Region 1985/6 1995/6
North East 3.955 (0.369) 6.194 (0.626)
Yorks & Humber 3.289 (0.225) 6.114 (0.354)
North West 3.668 (0.217) 6.078 (0.310)
East Midlands 3.663 (0.245) 5.705 (0.342)
West Midlands 3.418 (0.248) 6.191 (0.338)
South East 4.859 (0.143) 7.029 (0.193)
South West 3.387 (0.218) 5.799 (0.312)
Wales 3.145 (0.287) 5.221 (0.374)
Scotland 5.225 (0.341) 6.937 (0.329)
Table 9: Average marginal tax rate by region and year
Year
Region 1985/6 1995/6
North East 0.366 (0.006) 0.351 (0.007)
Yorks & Humber 0.358 (0.004) 0.359 (0.004)
North West 0.364 (0.004) 0.360 (0.003)
East Midlands 0.374 (0.004) 0.355 (0.004)
West Midlands 0.361 (0.005) 0.362 (0.004)
South East 0.384 (0.002) 0.362 (0.002)
South West 0.359 (0.004) 0.353 (0.004)
Wales 0.349 (0.006) 0.342 (0.005)
Scotland 0.379 (0.005) 0.366 (0.004)
37